Inferences in the comprehension of and memory for text by Goetz, Ernest T.
ILL INO I S
UNIVERSITY OF ILLINOIS AT URBANA-CHAMPAIGN
PRODUCTION NOTE
University of Illinois at
Urbana-Champaign Library
Large-scale Digitization Project, 2007.

c5 '/0. /ClkA
T
E
C
H
N
I
C
A
L
Center for the Study of Reading
T;U- LCRARY OF T',.E
OCT 7 798i
AT UP-- -
UNIVERSITY OF ILLINOIS
AT URBANA-CHAMPAIGN
1005 West Nevada Street
Urbana, Illinois 61801
BOLT BERANEK AND NEWMAN INC.
50 Moulton Street
Cambridge, Massachusetts 02138
Technical Report No. 49
INFERENCES IN THE COMPREHENSION OF
AND MEMORY FOR TEXT
Ernest T. Goetz
University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign
July 1977
R
E
P
0
R
T
S

CENTER FOR THE STUDY OF READING
Technical Report No. 49
INFERENCES IN THE COMPREHENSION OF
AND MEMORY FOR TEXT
Ernest T. Goetz
University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign
July 1977
University of Illinois
at Urbana-Champaign
51 Gerty Drive
Champaign, Illinois 61820
Bolt Beranek and Newman Inc.
50 Moulton Street
Cambridge, Massachusetts 02138
A version of this paper was submitted in partial fulfillment of the
requirements for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy in Psychology in the
Graduate College of the University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign, 1977.
I would like to thank the many people who helped me complete this
project: my advisor Richard C. Anderson; committee members William Brewer,
Ann Brown, and Rand Spiro; my firends and colleagues Diane Schallert, Ralph
Reynolds, Jim Pichert, Sally Standiford, Dean Radin, Zohara Shifrin, and
Katy Donner; and the superior clerical and support staff of the Center for
the Study of Reading, and in particular Mike Nivens, Larry Shirey, and
Bonnie Anderson. The cooperation of the teachers and students at George-
town High School, Georgetown, Illinois; Milford Township High School, Mil-
ford, Illinois; and Columbian High School, Tiffin, Ohio is gratefully
acknowledged.
This research was supported in part by the National Institute of
Education under Contract NO. US-NIE-C-400-76-0116 and Grant No. HEW-NIE-
9-74-0007.
INFERENCES IN THE COMPREHENSION OF AND MEMORY FOR TEXT
Abstract
Two studies are reported in which texts were systematically varied so
as to vary the importance of inferences in the text. The central question
investigated was whether variations in the importance of an inference
would affect the probability that the inference would be made.
While it is by now well established that inference plays a vital role
in discourse comprehension and memory, the variables which control
inferential processes are not yet fully identified or well understood.
Indeed, much of the recent research on inference has simply sought to
establish the existence and importance of inferential processes, and
has failed to illuminate the controlling variables. While the effect of
task variables on inference has received a fair amount of study, little
attention has been paid to text variables.
A large body of research has established that the important elements
of a text are better remembered. It was hypothesized that importance should
also increase the probability that an inference would be made. The
salience of premise material which cued the invited inference was also
varied. It was hypothesized that highly salient premises should increase
the probability that an inference would be made.
Six stories of about 500 words were used, and each story appeared
in eight different versions which were identical except for the sections
varied in order to manipulate the importance of the inference and the
salience of the premise. The target inference was the same for all
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versions of a story and importance was varied without changing the
plausibility of the inference. In half of the passage versions, the
inference was explicitly stated in the text. High school students
served as subjects.
In the first experiment, inference was tested using multiple-choice
recognition, while a cued recall test was employed in the second experiment.
The results of both studies confirmed the major prediction, that people
are more likely to make an important than unimportant inference. The
first study also revealed that people are more likely to rate an important
inference as having been stated in the passage. Highly salient premises
were also found to increase the probablity that an inference would be
made in both studies.
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CHAPTER 1
INTRODUCTION
Overview
Two claims are assumed to be beyond dispute:
1. Inferences are an integral part of discourse comprehension and
memory.
2. In comprehending discourse, people do not make all possible
inferences.
Strong intuitive arguments can be mustered for the truth of both statements.
That the first is true can be seen by an examination of the communica-
tive process. Grice (1975) and Gordon and Lakoff (1975) have made a de-
tailed analysis of human communication in terms of the tacit rules, or
"conversational postulates," which govern the behavior of both the sender
(writer or speaker) and receiver (reader or listener) of communications
(written or oral discourse). The general goal of the sender is to be
understood by the receiver. Thus a speaker will not use an utterance unless
he is convinced that the listener will have the requisite knowledge of the
language, knowledge of the culture, and knowledge of the world. A further
assumption made by the sender is that the receiver will use this knowledge
not only to comprehend the literal meaning of the discourse, but also to
derive inferences that complete the discourse where the message itself was
incomplete or unspecified. Thus, if a speaker says,
I saw John driving down the roads
he must believe that the listener knows English and knows what a road is.
He further assumes that the listener will draw the inference that John was
driving a car. Inference makes it possible for the sender to convey a
great deal of information in a message of manageable size. If the sender
had to state explicitly all the information which he or she wished to con-
vey, the sheer bulk of the resulting discourse would make the communication
of even the simplest ideas difficult.
Similarly, the major goal of the receiver is to understand the message.
The receiver makes the assumption that the message is potentially sensible,
even though incompletely specified, and uses inference and other construc-
tive processes to render it so. Inference also makes it possible for the
receiver to go beyond the information which the sender intended to com-
municate.
While the receiver must make some inferences in order to comprehend
the discourse, he or she cannot be expected to make all possible inferences.
This must be so simply because the number of possible inferences is essen-
tially infinite. Thus, in the above example, one possible string of in-
ferences might run:
John was driving a car.
The car was powered by gas.
John had purchased gas for the car at a filling station.
The filling station had an attendant.
The attendant was paid a wage.
Clearly this string of inferences could be carried out to any length.
Inference strings could branch at any point and in many directions. Thus,
other inference strings might be constructed which run from the cost of
gasoline, to petroleum company profits, to U. S. foreign policy, or from
road construction, to labor unions, or road grading equipment.
3Since people make some but not all possible inferences, the specifi-
cation and understanding of the processes which determine which inferences
are, in fact, made becomes a major problem in the understanding of dis-
course comprehension and memory. In addressing this problem, the two
studies reported in this paper represent attempts at influencing the proba-
bility that an inference would occur by systematically varying text.
The major prediction was that a subject would be more likely to make an
inference if that inference were important than if it were unimportant.
Inferences in Discourse: A Brief Review
The study of inferential processes in discourse comprehension and
memory, and indeed, of discourse comprehension and memory itself, is al-
most a new field for experimental psychology. To recapitualte a well-
known history, Ebbinghaus (1883) invented the nonsense syllable in the hope
that the novelty and simplicity of artificially constructed letter strings
would minimize contact with preexisting knowledge, thus enabling the un-
contaminated study of the formation of associations, or the accretion of
trace strength. The long-standing hope of associative psychologists and
behaviorists is that there exist general laws of learning and memory,
which, though best studied with simple organisms (rats, pigeons) in simple
environments (t-mazes, Skinner boxes), would generalize to and prove suf-
ficient to explain the behavior of the seemingly most complex human being
reading the most complex novel. Thus were nonsense syllables studied, and
thus, for the most part was text ignored, despite muffled warnings that
things might not be so simple. The recent work of Montague, Adams,
Prytullac, and others (see Montague, 1972, for a review) indicated that a
result of presenting college sophomores with nonsense syllables, paired
4associates, and word lists is often to goad them into devising highly com-
plex and idiosyncratic strategies in order to impose order and meaning on
the senseless scrambles foisted on them by the experimenter. This work
stands as a striking confirmation and long overdue acknowledgement of
Bartlett's (1932) warning that apparently simple experimental materials
are no guarantee that ensuing psychological processes will be simple when
the organism under study is as rich in complexity as a human being.
Given this background, it is perhaps not surprising that inferential
processes, although documented near the advent of scientific psychology,
have been largely ignored almost to the present. Binet and Henri (1894;
Thieman & Brewer, in press) noted what they called "errors through imagina-
tion" in the recall of stories. These errors were said to be characterized
not so much by change in meaning as by addition to the meaning of the
original version. Thus, upon hearing "Thursday" a child would recall
"last Thursday" or "Thursday evening." Likewise, "one of them" became
"the youngest one," and "his parents' home" was recalled as "his bome."
Bartlett's (1932) account of reconstructive processes in the repeated
reproduction (recall) of "The War of the Ghosts" is the most famous early
account of inferential elaboration of discourse recall. Bartlett reported
that some Subjects used the general setting and affective aspects, along
with embellished details or inc.idents of the story, to reconstruct an
elaborate, if inaccurate, story. Some subjects "rationalized" the story,
rendering it more sensible by filling gaps or distorting events, as, for
example, by postulating causal relations between events.
Although the work of Binet and Henri and of Bartlett might have served
as a springboard for the study of inferential processes, it was, for the
5most part, ignored or disputed. Gomulicki (1956) investigated the immedi-
ate recall of prose passages of 15 to 200 words in length, and found that
omissions were very frequent, while inferential elaboration was quite rare.
He concluded that memory for prose was more accurately described as abstrac-
tive than constructive, a view shared by Kay (1955) and echoed by Zangwill
(1972). In fact, Gomulicki reported that when judges were given both re-
calls and actual abstracts of the same passages, they did little better than
chance at distinguishing them. It should, however, be pointed out that
this failure does not ensure that no psychologically useful distinctions
can be drawn between the processes involved in abstracting a text and in
recalling it: if judges were (as they often are on television) unable to
distinguish margarine from butter, it would, nevertheless, be unreasonable
to conclude that they were produced by the same processes.
Gauld and Stephenson (1967) suspected that the changes and distortions
in recall which Bartlett found were due to deliberate inventions by sub-
jects who want to "fill up gaps in their memory," a process which should be
distinguished from memory itself. They ran several studies using the "War
of the Ghosts" which showed that telling subjects to recall only what was
in the story and to leave gaps rather than invent if they had forgotten
sharply reduced the number of meaning-changing intrusions or additions.
If the subjects were simply told to be accurate, the effect was the same as
the longer injunction. Of course, these results are amenable to other inter-
pretations. The former instruction might set up demand characteristics
(Orne, 1962) which favor the production of gaps. The latter, as well as the
former, might cause the subject to raise his or her subjective criterion
for the acceptable confidence level for response emission (Cofer, 1961, 1967;
Adams & Bray, 1970), causing the subject to suppress information he or
she remembers.
Although the importance of inference in discourse was long disputed,
a recent surge of evidence and interest has thrust its study into the spot-
light it deserves. The work of Bransford and his colleagues has been in-
strumental in this turnabout. Bransford, Barclay, and Franks (1972) re-
ported that subjects who read sentences like,
Three turtles rested on a log, and a fish swam beneath them,
had higher recognition scores for foils like,
Three turtles rested on a log, and a fish swam beneath it.
than did subjects who read sentences in which the spatial relationships
were changed ("beside" substituted for "on" in both the target sentence and
foil). These recognition confusions were due to inferences which resulted
from the interaction of the subjects' knowledge of spatial relationships
with the information supplied by the study sentence.
In another study, Johnson, Bransford, and Solomon (1973) presented
subjects with brief passages such as:
John was trying to fix the bird house. He was pounding the nail
when his father came out to watch him and to help him do the work.
or,
It was late at night when .the phone rang and a voice gave a
frantic cry. The spy threw the secret document into the flames
just in time, since 30 seconds longer would have been too late.
They found that subjects who heard such passages were very likely to falsely
recognize statements which included an unstated instrument (e.g., John was
using the hammer to fix the birdhouse) or consequence (The spy burned the
7document just in time). Subject who heard control passages where minimal
changes in the wording altered the meaning (e.g., looking for the nail in-
stead of pounding the nail; pulled the secret document from the fire in-
stead of threw the secret document into the fire) easily rejected the foils.
Brewer (1974) has produced dramatic demonstrations of inferences. He
showed that subjects tended to recall inferences which were probable, though
not logically necessary, consequences of the sentences presented. Thus,
the sentences,
The hungry python caught the mouse.
The safe cracker put the match to the fuse.
The bullet hit Superman's chest.
were often recalled as,
The hungry python ate the mouse.
The safe cracker lit the fuse.
The bullet bounced off Superman's chest.
Such inferences constituted 20% to 30% of the total recalls across 46 items
and ran as high as 80% to 88% of the recalls of some sentences.
Another line of research which has provided a striking demonstration
of inferential processes is the research on linear orderings of Potts
(e.g., 1972), Barclay (1973), and others. This research has shown that
when subjects are shown a series of sentences Bill is stronger than Tom
and Tom is stronger than John, they falsely recognize sentences like Bill
is stronger than John which were never presented but could be inferred.
Toward a Definition of Inference: How Broad a Term?
The trickle of studies on inference has become a deluge, but before
examining more closely current research on inferences in discourse, a
critique of current use of the term must be presented, and the meaning of
the term as used in this paper needs to be clarified.
The first notion of inference, which in the present context must be
rejected, is inference as defined in formal logic. While logical inferences
are important, the cases sanctioned by logic or mathematics do not exhaust
the types of inference involved in natural language comprehension. Formal
systems involve an idealized, tidy notion of inference which is unsuited for
use as a psychological model. The inferential processes of humans are
simply not limited to, nor are they always guided by, those forms of infer-
ence permitted in logic and mathematics.
A second possible notion of inference, which must also be rejected,
is that anything that is recalled or recognized as having occurred in a
text, but which was not a part of the text, constitutes an inference. This
definition of inference is too broad. Material which is recalled or rec-
ognized, perhaps on the basis of thematic or topical relationship to the
text, but which does not specifically depend on any of the information in
the text, should be distinguished from inference. Several recent studies
have shown that subjects sometimes inject information from their prior
knowledge when the topic of the text is familiar. For example, Kintsch and
Van Dijk (in press) report an experiment in which subjects read paragraphs
on familiar topics such as Bible stories. One story dealt with Joseph and
his brothers in Egypt. When subjects were tested for free recall after
48 hours, subjects seemed completely unable to distinguish between the
story and their prior knowledge, and tended to produce everything they
knew about Joseph and his brothers, no matter how unrelated to the text.
Sulin and Dooling (1974) presented subjects with brief biographical pas-
sages which were purportedly about fictitious or famous persons. When
tested one week later, subjects who read the famous person versions tended
to falsely recognize statements of common knowledge about the main char-
acter which were not specifically related to the text. Brown, Smiley, Day,
Townsend, and Lawton (1977) have reported similar results with grade
school children.
In order to qualify for classification as an inference, the material
must at least depend upon specific information in the text. Being able
to relate recalled or recognized material to specific information in the
text, however, is not a sufficient criterion for classification as a text-
based inference. Frederiksen (1976) has developed a taxonomy of text-
based inferences in which every proposition in a free recall protocol is
identified with the proposition in the text with which it is most closely
related. The inferential process necessary to generate the inference from
the text base is classified according to the taxonomy which consists of
eight major inference types which are divided into 26 classes, which are
further divided into subclasses. The difficulty with Frederiksen's system
is that, as currently constituted, anything which is recalled will be
matched with some proposition in the text base and then classified as some
type of inference. For example, if a subject reads,
The dog chased the cat,
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and then recalls,
An animal did somehting.
this would be classified as a superordinate inference. When a subject
recalls,
She (Mother) won't get mad,
after having heard,
Mother will get mad.
the recall is classified as a negation inference. When used so broadly,
the term "inference" becomes vacuous.
Clearly what is needed is a definition of inference which avoids the
problems of excessive narrowness on the one hand and indiscriminate inclu-
sion on the other hand. Brewer (1974), one of the first to seriously come
to grips with this problem, noted that any notion of logical inference would
be too narrow to serve as a definition of psychological inference. He set
out to specify an area of psychological inference which falls outside the
bounds of formal logic. Such inferences, called "pragmatic inferences"
since they derive from expectations based on a person's knowledge of the
world, are identified by the but not test. One sentence is said to prag-
matically imply another if negating the second sentence and conjoining it
to the first with but results in an acceptable sentence. Thus,
The hungry python caught the mouse,
is said to pragmatically imply,
The hungry python ate the mouse.
because,
The hungry python caught the mouse, but did not eat it,
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is an acceptable sentence. Likewise,
The safecracker put the match to the fuse.
pragmatically implies,
The safecracker lit the fuse,
as evidenced by the acceptability of,
The safecracker put the match to the fuse, but it did not light.
Brewer demonstrated that the but not test, which was based on Lakoff's
(1971) analysis of the use of but as a denial of expectation, produces un-
acceptable sentences when applied to sentences which are linked by logical
implication and also sentences which lack an inferential relationship. It
should be noted that the above examples of superordinate and negation infer-
ences from Frederiksen's taxonomy fail the but not test, since neither,
The dog chased the cat, but the animal didn't do anything.
nor,
Mother will get mad, but she will get mad.
is acceptable.
The generality of the but not test, as originally formulated, is lim-
ited since it treats sentences in isolation, and tests only whether one
sentence is implied by another. However, the test can easily be extended.
In connected discourse, it is often the case that an implication is the
joint product of several sentences rather than the derivative of a single
sentence. For example, examine the story in Figure 1 about a career woman
about to leave on a business trip. This story is one version of one of the
stories used in the studies to be reported here. The numbers and under-
lining have been added to permit easy indexing of key portions of the text.
At (1) the woman has just enough time left to catch her plane. As she
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packed (2), she remembered that she was supposed to speak to her son. Later
in the passage, at (3), it is clear that she arrived quite late at the air-
port. The invited inference is stated explicitly at (4), but was deleted
from the implied passage versions used in the studies. Clearly this impli-
cation is based on information spread throughout the passage. If the but
not test is generalized to permit compound premises, then the invited in-
ference can be shown to be a pregmatic implication because,
A woman had just enough time to reach an airport for a flight.
She remembered that she was supposed to talk to her son. She
arrived late at the airport, but not because she had talked to
her son.
passes the but not test.
The inferences to be studied in the experiments reported in this
paper are pragmatic inferences by this broadened definition.
Current Research on Inference
Research on inference currently includes the study of the development
of inferential processes in children (e.g., Paris, 1975; Paris & Lindauer,
1976; Brown, 1975), the formal representation of inferences in discourse
analysis (e.g., Frederiksen, 1972, 1975c; Crothers, 1972; Kintsch, 1972,
1974) and computer simulation of human inference (e.g., Schank, 1972;
Charniak, 1975; Collins, Warnock, Aiello & Miller, 1975). No attempt will
be made to provide an exhaustive review of all areas of this research.
Rather, this section will be focused on inferences made by adult humans in
comprehension and memory with sentences and connected discourse.
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Figure 1
A Career in Sales*
Joan dragged out her suitcase and began the well-practiced ritual
of packing for a trip. (1) She had just enough time left to pack and
get to O'Hare Airport in time for her 2 o'clock flight to San Francisco.
It had been three years since her divorce, and she had spent much of that
time on the road. Her new career not only permitted her to do the trav-
eling she'd missed as a housewife and mother, it forced her to do it. At
first it was terribly exciting jetting all over the country, seeing new
regions, cities, and towns. San Francisco was one of Joan's favorite
cities. She had fallen in love with the hills and the Bay, and had made
several good friends there. By now, though, some of the glamour of con-
stant travel had been lost to the repetitious drudgery of packing and un-
packing, and of taxi rides to airports and hotels.
Fortunately, Joan still liked her career. She'd never had a real
job before,since she'd married right after college and had never worked
outside of her home. She'd been a business major in college, and she was
happy to find a job in sales with a plastic home products firm. But she
had certainly never expected her career to bloom so rapidly. She had done
so well the first year that she had been promoted to a national sales
trainer. She enjoyed helping trainees and keeping seasoned salesmen up
to date on new products and promotional developments. Lately, however,
the frantic pace of the job and jet lag had begun to wear on her.
Joan was well adjusted to the divorce by now. Her job kept her too
busy for regrets, and she met and knew too many people to be really lonely.
She was grateful to her ex-husband for agreeing to keep the children.
It was the logical solution, since she wanted to be free to pursue her
career, and because he had remarried and could give them a better home.
Joan was so wrapped up in her work that she hadn't seen the children much
lately. (2) As she finished packing Joan remembered that she had promised
to talk to her oldest son before she left town. He was thinking of trans-
ferring to another college. She thought of her own college days while
she gathered up her toothbrush and other essentials and stuffed them into
her travel kit.
(3) O'Hare was as busy as ever when Joan arrived one-half hour late
at 2:30. (4) She was late because she'd stopped to talk to her son. She
exchanged her ticket on the 2 o'clock flight she missed for standby on the
3:30 p.m. flight. (5) When she arrived in San Francisco she learned that
her original flight had unexplainably lost altitude and crashed into the
mountains north of Denver. There were no known survivors. Joan contem-
plated the strange twist of fate that saved her life. She shuddered as
she thought of the death she so narrowly escaped. During the taxi ride
to her hotel, Joan thought about her new career and her old life.
*This is the important stated salient version of Passage 1 used in Ex-
periments I and II. Numbers and underlining have been added to permit easy
indexing.
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The bulk of this research, including the work of the Bransford group
(c.f., Bransford & Johnson, 1973; Bransford & McCarrell, 1974) and Brewer
and his colleagues (e.g., Brewer, 1974; Harris, 1974; Brewer & Lichtenstein,
1975; Schweller, Brewer & Dahl, 1976) bear witness to a single fact: that
inferences do indeed occur when people read (or hear) and remember sentences
or text. These demonstrations of the occurrence of inference have estab-
lished inference as a major component of how people understand and remem-
ber verbal messages, and have played an important role in ending the long
history in psychology of the purposeful neglect of constructive processes.
In this sense, recent research has succeeded where Binet and Henri and
Bartlett failed. This research also serves the further purpose of demon-
strating and establishing the range of the phenomena. For example, by
showing that subjects tended to recall,
The truck driver asked the waitress for some coffee.
when they had read,
The truck driver told the waitress that he wanted to have some
coffee.
and often recalled or falsely recognized,
The angry farmer frightened the boys.
after reading,
The angry farmer frightened the trespassing boys.
Schweller, Brewer, and Dahl demonstrated pragmatic inference in recall and
recognition for the illocutionary and perlocutionary force of statements.
While these demonstrations have served a vital role, the occurrence
and importance of inferential processes is by now firmly established, and
the time has come for research to move beyond demonstrations to explorations
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of how inferences work. So far, little research has been directed at de-
tailing the controlling variables and processes of inference. One ques-
tion which has been the subject of much recent study is whether inference
occurs at comprehension or at recall. The next section presents a dis-
cussion of this issue.
When do inferences occur? Perhaps the most direct attack on the ques-
tion of when inference occurs is the verification latency experiments of
Kintsch (1974) and Singer (1976, 1977) in which reaction times for the
verification of statements implied by a text are compared to those for
statements which were explicitly stated by the text. The rationale for
these studies is that if inference occurs at comprehension, then the veri-
fication time for implied statements should not differ from explicit state-
ments. If inference occurs at test, then the verification of implicit
statements should take longer. Kintsch reports a series of three studies
which he conducted with Keenan and McKoon. The first two studies employed
short, two-sentence passages and longer texts. The short passages were
constructed with the intent that the inferences would be required at reading
in order to comprehend and integrate the paragraph. The inferences studied
included implied causation such as,
A burning cigarette was carelessly discarded.
The fire destroyed many acres of virgin forest.
which implies,
A discarded cigarette started a fire.
The longer passages varied in length from 40 to 120 words and dealt with
obscure facts. For both short and long paragraphs, explicit versions,
which were identical to the implied versions except that they contained a
16
statement of the content of the implied proposition, were also employed.
In all of these studies, subjects were presented with sentences and
instructed to decide whether they were true or false based on information
stated or implied in the passage. The crucial inference questions were
always true, but false filler items were included. In the first study,
subjects were tested immediately after each passage. Kintsch reasoned that
subjects would construct the same propositional representation regardless
of whether they had seen the explicit or implicit version of the passage,
and that verification would be based on this propositional representation.
He therefore predicted that there would be no differences between verifi-
cation latencies for implicit and explicit statements. Contrary to
Kintsch's hypothesis, implicit versions led to higher error rates as well
as longer latencies for correct (affirmative) responses than explicit
versions.
Kintsch argued that the disadvantage of the implicit material was not
caused by failure to generate inferences at reading. Rather, the explicit
passage versions were said to produce a surface representation of the in-
formation, as well as the underlying propositional representation. Only
the propositional representation was available to subjects who read the im-
plicit versions. After reading the explicit version, subjects could match
the probe against the surface representation more quickly and reliably
than subjects who read the implicit version could verify the probe against
the propositional representation.
Kintsch reasoned that if the advantage of the subjects who read the
explicit versions was indeed due to the persistence of a surface represen-
tation, a delay before the test sufficient to ensure the loss of the sur-
face representation would negate this advantage. In the second study,
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subjects read all the passages followed by a 15-minute interpolated
sentence memory task, and finally, the verification test. This time the
results supported the prediction: there was no difference between the
verification latencies for implicit and explicit versions, although a non-
significant trend toward lower error rates for explicit versions persisted.
The third study replicated and extended this result by varying the
retention interval, using 0, 30-second, 20-minute, and 48-hour delays.
Orthogonal tests collapsing across the two short and two long retention
intervals revealed that at 0 and 30 seconds, explicit questions were veri-
fied more quickly than implicit questions, but that no significant differ-
ence was found at 20 minutes and 48 hours.
The results of the three studies reported are consistent with the
hypothesis that the inferences occurred at encoding, provided it is assumed
that verification is consummated when there is a match on either surface
form or propositional content, with the former being faster. However, there
are several weaknesses in the designs of the studies, and alternative ex-
planations are possible. In the first two experiments, explicit versions
were not only longer than the implicit versions, but also syntactically
more complex and less readable. In the third study, the inferential status
of test items was confounded with the content, as a particular item was
either implicit or explicit. Although Kintsch invokes stored surface
information as the cause of the more rapid verification of explicit items,
examination of the materials reveals that, at least for the first experi-
ment, test items were not verbatim copies of anything in the original
passages. The use of a delayed test in order to eliminate memory for sur-
face information as a factor leaves open the possibility that the failure
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to find a difference between stated and implied items may have been due
to the forgetting of explicitly stated information. If there were for-
getting of the propositional representation, or meaning, the subjects would
be unable to verify even explicit items by directly matching them to the
propositional representation, but instead would have to infer them from
a skeletal representation. Similarly, subjects might have to infer implied
statements at a delayed test, whether or not they had previously beep in-
ferred. A better control for surface information would be to systematically
vary the similarity of the test item to the surface form of the explicit
version.
Despite the similarity between the studies of Kitsch and Singer, their
results stand in direct opposition. Singer (1976) found that 10 seconds
after reading sentences like,
The small girl spent the gleaming penny.
subjects were able to verify sentence like,
The penny was shiny.
which were paraphrases of portions of the study sentences, more rapidly
than they could verify inferences like,
The penny was new.
This result obtained despite the fact that the paraphrase and the inference
were matched in terms of surface similarity to the original sentence.
In a second paper (1977), Singer reported three experiments which
tested both recognition, where subjects were to indicate whether the test
sentence was identical to a study sentence, and verification. Test items
like,
The sailor swept the floor with the broom.
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were presented following a three-sentence passage that began either with
a verbatim copy of the test probe in the explicit version or a sentence
like,
The sailor swept the floor in the cabin.
in the implied version. In the first study, subjects heard 12 experimental
and eight filler passages before being tested. No difference was found
between the acceptance rate for stated and implied items, but implied
items took significantly longer to confirm. In the second study, subjects
were tested six seconds after hearing each passage. In this study, accep-
tance rates were much higher for explicit items, especially on the recog-
nition test. Again, explicit items were accepted more rapidly than infer-
ences. In both studies, the reaction time difference was consistent
across recognition and verification tests. The final study compared the
verification of inferences with explicit items which were paraphrases
rather than verbatim copies of the first sentence of the passage. Thus,
for the above example, the explicit version contained the sentence,
The sailor used the broom to sweep the floor.
while the implicit version and test item remained unchanged from the pre-
vious studies. Subjects heard all the passages before the verification
test of six experimental and six false filler items. While there was no
difference in the acceptance rates, explicit items were again verified
more rapidly. Singer concluded that since, in his studies, inferences
always took longer, even when the test was delayed and when the explicit
items were only paraphrases of the original passage, at least some portion
of the inferential processing must occur at test. Sfnger took the dif-
ference between explicit and implicit verification times, about 200 milli-
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seconds, as an estimate of the time required for this additional processing.
Although Singer's results seem to indicate some inferential processing
at test, his interpretation of the reaction time difference as a measure
of the time taken for such processing rests on one rather tenuous assump-
tion: that reaction times averaged across subjects or across items are
truly representative of each subject or item. An alternative interpreta-
tion is that a subject makes the inference at comprehension for some pro-
portion of the implied items, and on those items verifies the test sentence
as rapidly as if it had been explicit (ignoring for the moment the pos-
sibility of faster verification for explicit items due to a surface level
match). For the remainder of the implied items, the subject fails to make
the inference at comprehension and must make it at test, producing a slower
verification than for explicit items. Thus, verification times averaged
across subjects or items would reflect the proportion of items for which
subjects failed to make the inference at comprehension, as well as extra
processing time required when the failure occurs. Further, only in the
initial study was surface similarity between the study sentence and test
probe controlled. In the first two experiments of the more recent paper,
the test item was a verbatim copy of the explicit version. In the third
experiment, although the syntax of the sentence was changed in order to
alter word order between the explicit version and the test item, the
lexical form of all content words was identical for both versions. Thus,
in all three of these experiments, the faster verification of explicit
items could be explained in terms of a better match between the surface
form of the explicit study items and the test sentences.
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While it is not clear how to reconcile the disparity between the
results of Kintsch and Singer, the picture is complicated still further by
a third line of studies which has produced an entirely different result.
The linear ordering studies of Potts (e.g., Potts, 1972; Scholtz and Potts,
1974) have consistently shown that statements which were never presented
were actually verified more rapidly than copies of the statements which
were presented. In this research, subjects studied a series of comparative
statements which permitted the ordering of a list of items on their value
on some dimension. Statements which compared two items which varied
widely on the dimension were verified more rapidly than close comparisons,
regardless of whether or not they had been presented.
Frederiksen (1975a) employed a very different approach to the problem.
He reasoned that if inference was a vital part of the comprehension pro-
cess, then the appearance of inferences in recall should increase with
repeated exposures to a passage, since each rereading would provide an
opportunity for further inferencing. If, on the other hand,'inferences
are produced at recall merely to fill up gaps in memory, then the appear-
ance of inference should decrease with repeated readings of the text,
since as subjects learned more of the text, they would have fewer gaps to
fill. In the study reported, and another study (1975b) discussed below,
Frederiksen obtained results which he interpreted as supportive of the
inference-at-comprehension hypothesis, since no effect of trials was ob-
tained. Interpretation of this result is complicated by Frederiksen's
scoring system, particularly by his distinction between inferred and
elaborative material. Only statements "necessarily implied" by the text
were classified as inferential, thus, some of the elaborations were prob-
ably pragmatic inferences, and elaborative material actually showed a
significant decrease across trials. However, even if a significant increase
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in inferences across trials were found, this would not unequivocally sup-
port the inference-at-comprehension position. Suppose that inference oc-
curs at recall. Since inferencedepends upon both information in the text
and extra-textual knowledge, if the subject is able to remember more of the
text at recall, he will have a better base for inferencing, and may there-
fore produce more inferences.
The study by Spiro (1975), which will be discussed in more detail in
the next section, clearly demonstrated constructive processes which oc-
curred after comprehension, since they were produced by a manipulation
which occurred after subjects had finished reading the passage. The study
demonstrated that constructive processes can occur after comprehension, but
does not bear on the issue of whether inferences normally occur at com-
prehension or output.
In summary, the verification latency experiments have produced con-
flicting results, each of which is open to alternative explanations, and
havemade little or no progress toward resolving the issue of when infer-
ences occur. The studies by Frederiksen and Spiro also fail to fix the
temporal locus of inferences at comprehension or at recall. Perhaps the
question itself is miscast: it seems most unlikely that inferences occur
only at comprehension or output. A better approach might be to assume that
inference can occur at either time, and to study variables which control
whether or not inferences will be made at comprehension, or that influence
inferential processes at output. The previous research can be interpreted
to show that inferences are likely to occur at comprehension if they are
essential to comprehension (Kintsch, 1974), or if study instructions and
conditions favor elaborative processing (Potts, 1972; Scholtz & Potts, 1974;
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Frederiksen, 1972, 1975b). They will occur during retention or at test if
they did not occur at comprehension, and enough of the text is remembered
to provide the basis for inference, or if ancillary information or test
questions cue them (Singer, 1976, 1977; Spiro, 1975).
Although the studies reported in this paper do not directly address the
issue, it seems likely that importance as manipulated in these experiments
may affect when inferences occur. It seems reasonable that the effect of
importance would be to increase the probability that a subject will make
an inference at comprehension. An output explanation of the effect of
importance on inference is possible, however, since importance might act
to increase the probability that the subject will remember the explicit
information upon which an inference is based, thereby increasing the
probability that the inference can be made at the test.
In~vestigationsof Variables Which Control Inference
Task manipulations. The most direct task manipulation is simply to
vary the instruction or the task by which subjects are tested. Thus as
discussed above, Gauld and Stephenson (1967) were able to greatly reduce
the number of consturctive productions in discourse recall by instructing
the subjects to write down only what they were certain was contained in.
the original passage. Taking the opposite tack, Brockway, Chmielewski,
and Cofer (1974, Experiment 1) had subjects read two brief passages
(similar to those of Frase, 1969) and then, in separate tasks, the subjects
were asked to recall the passage and to generate statements'about the
passage which were "logical extensions or conclusions, or ideas compatible
with the paragraph, or associations of any type" (p. 197), bit could not
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include sentences repeated or paraphrased from the text. Independent
raters judged the generated statements to be reliably less related to the
text than the free recall.
Singer (1977) found that subjects gave more affirmative responses
to inferences, as well as explicit items, when they were asked to judge the
truth of a statement (verification test) than when they were asked to
indicate if a sentence had appeared in a passage (recognition test). When
the test followed immediately after the passage (Experiment II), the dif-
ference between acceptance rates in verification and recognition tests was
much greater for inferences than for explicit items. Brockway, Chmielew-
ski, and Cofer (1974, Experiment ii) found that subjects produced more af-
firmative responses to generated statements related to the original pas-
sage when told to indicate whether statements were inferable from the
passage or when asked to decide whether statements were consistent with
the passage than when they were to decide if the statement had actually
occurred in the passage.
The effect of varying instructions at comprehension has been studied
by Frederiksen (1972, 1975b) and Spiro (1975). Frederiksen presented
subjects with a 500-work passage adapted from Dawes (1966) with instruc-
tions simply to learn it for a memory test, to think about solutions to
problems stated in the passage while learning it for a memory test, or
simply to think about solutions to the problems. Subjects who received
the first two sets of instructions recalled the passage after each of four
readings. Subjects who received the third set of instructions were not
tested until after the fourth reading. All subjects were given a surprise
delayed recall, one week later. Frederiksen found some evidence, beginning
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with the second test, that subjects who received the problem solving plus
memory test instructions produced more inferences than subjects who re-
ceived the memory test instructions. After four readings and at delayed
recall, the proportion of recalled material scored as inferential was
higher for the two problem solving groups than for the memory test only
group.
Spiro (1975) told subjects either that they were in a memory experi-
ment or that they were in an experiment concerning reactions to interper-
sonal relations and then had subjects read a story about an engaged couple,
part of which discussed the feelings of each person regarding children.
Some of the subjects read a version of the passage in which the couple
was in total agreement to forego a family, while other subjects read a
passage version in which disagreement over the issue began a heated de-
bate. Several minutes after reading the passage, some of the subjects
who read each version were casually informed that the couple got married and
lived happily ever after, others were told that the couple had called off
the engagement and had never seen each other again, while the remainder
were 'told nothing of the outcome of the story. All subjects were later
given a recall test for the passage after a delay of 2 days, 3 weeks, or
6 weeks. Some of the subjects received a story and subsequent informa-
tion about the couple which described a scenario which was "balanced"
(Heider, 1958) in that it was consonant with knowledge and expectations
about interpersonal relations, while for other subjects the scenario was
unbalanced. Spiro was able to predict the sorts of constructive processes
which would be invoked to resolve the imbalance. Of more interest here,
however, was the prediction, confirmed by the results, that the inter-
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personal relations experiment cover story would produce many more construc-
tive errors. This result obtained because subjects who thought they were
in the interpersonal relations experiment were more likely to engage their
knowledge of interpersonal relationships than were subjects who were trying
to memorize a passage for a memory experiment.
Taken together this research clearly and consistently shows a strong
effect of instructions and task on inferential processes.
Text manipulat ions. To date, only Thorndyke (1977, 1976) has studied
the effect of passage organization on inference. In the first of these
studies (1977), organization was varied by presenting a statement of the
theme at the beginning or end of a story, by deleting the theme, or by
using a descriptive passage devoid of the temporal and causal relationships
present in the stories. The sentences of the passages were then presented
in normal or random order. Thorndyke found that subjects who read the
more highly organized passages were more likely to falsely recognize items
which could be inferred from the text but had not been explicitly stated.
Thorndyke (1976) has also investigated the effect of varying the
plausibility of an inference. Thorndyke prepared passages in which an
inference-priming sentence such as,
The hamburger chain owner was afraid his love for french
fries would ruin his marriage.
was followed later by a continuation sentence which increased the plausi-
bility of a likely inference (the "experimental" condition) or by a con-
tinuation sentence which did not affect plausibility (the "control" condi-
tion). Thus, when the experimental continuation,
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The hamburger chain owner decided to join Weight-Watchers
in order to save his marriage.
followed the inference-priming sentence shown above, the plausibility of
the appropriate inference,
The hamburger chain owner was very fat.
was increased, while the plausibility of the inappropriate inference,
The hamburger chain owner's wife didn't like french fries.
was reduced. The plausibility of the neutral inference,
The hamburger chain owner got his french fries free.
was unaffected. On the other hand, when the inference-priming sentence
was followed later by the control continuation sentence,
The hamburger chain owner decided to see a marriage couselor
in order to save his marriage.
the plausibility of all three inference types remain unchanged. Thorndyke's
first study (1976, Experiment I) showed that, when asked to write inferences
subjects who read the experimental passage version more often produced the
appropriate inference than the neutral inference, and less frequently
produced the inappropriate inference. Plausibility ratings reflected the
same effect: the appropriate inference was rated most plausible and the
inappropriate inference was rated least plausible. Subjects who read the
control passage version produced all three inference types equally often
and rated them equally plausible. The second study tested recognition.
Subject were instructed to respond affirmatively to those items explicitly
stated in the passage and to reject items which could be inferred. The
false recognition rate for subjects who read the experimental passages
was highest for appropriate and lowest for inappropriate inferences. No
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differences obtained for subjects who read the control versions.
These studies represent a solid beginning to the investigation of the
effect of text variables, but they are clearly just a beginning. The ef-
fect of most text variables upon inference has yet to be subjected to
informed speculation, let alone empirical investigation. A great deal
of research has shown that the important aspects of texts are remembered
while less important aspects are forgotten. Importance, whether measured
by subjective ratings or text structure analysis, has proven to be a power-
ful determinant of the recall of explicitly stated material in text. It
seems reasonable that it should also affect inference.
Importance: An Important Text Variable
The effect of importance on memory for text. The early research on
memory for connected discourse of Binet and Henri and others soon revealed
that when a group of subjects recall passages, some elements of the pas-
sages are recalled by most subjects, while other elements are recalled by
almost no one. The items which most subjects recalled were judged by
the researchers to be more closely related to the theme of the passage, or
more important. For example, Newman (1939) tested recall immediately after
reading a passage or after a retention interval of several hours of sleep
or waking. He found that "essential" story elements were better recalled
at the immediate test that "unessential" story elements, and that the
essential elements showed much less forgetting across the longer retention
intervals. Gomulicki (1956) investigated the immediate recall of prose
passages from 15 to 200 words. He found that although subjects were able
to recall the shorter passages verbatim, they were only able to recall
the more important aspects of the longer passages.
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Johnson (1970) developed a direct method of measuring importance.
Subjects were presented with a text that had previously been segmented into
pausal units (units between which pauses would be acceptable) and told
that whilesome of the units were central and essential to the passage,
others were of little importance and could be deleted with little or no
damage to the passage. The subjects were then told to indicate those
units which were least important and could therefore best be deleted.
Different groups of subjects were told to delete 1/4, 1/2, and 3/4 of the
pausal units, and the number of subjects who deleted a given unit became
the measure of importance. The passage was then administered to a second
group with instructions to learn it. Importance was found to be a strong
determinant of recall over retention intervals ranging up to 63 days.
A systematic, formal account of importance came with the development
of text structure models. Meyer and McConkie (1973) used a simple and
intuitive method of discourse structure analysis. They had graduate
students outline a passage, and then converted the outlines to tree struc-
tures. From these tree structures, three measures of the importance of an
idea unit in the structure of the passage were developed: a hierarchy
depth score, which measured how high in the hierarchy the unit occurred;
a units beneath score, which measured the number of units which were be-
neath the given unit in the hierarchy; and a combined hierarchy score,
which combined the above two measures, equally weighted, into a single,
unified measure. Significant effects upon recall were found for all three
measures. Further, when significant effects of serial position and rated
importance were found, these turned out to be largely due to the correla-
tion of those factors with hierarchical importance.
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Kintsch has replicated the results of Meyer and McConkie (1973),
using his more formal proposition description. Kintsch's (Kintsch &
Keenah, 1973) propositional rank is essentially equivalent to Meyer and
McConkie's hierarchy depth score, and Kintsch's counting of descendant
propositions is analogous to Meyer and McConkie's units beneath score.
Using Kintsch's system, McKoon (1977) was able to demonstrate that impor-
tant items are better recognized than unimportant items.
Both Meyer and McConkie (1972) and Kintsch and Keenan (1973) tested
the effect of importance using different portions of the same passage
with different importance values; therefore, importance was confounded
with the material involved. Meyer (1975) eliminated this confounding by
writing two versions of a passage such that a target paragraph, which
occurred in identical form and position in each passage version, was very
important in one version, and quite unimportant in the other version.
Importance was determined by height in a hierarchical text structure
derived by an analysis system based on a propositional text grammer which
Meyer had developed from Grimes' (1975) system. Again, importance aided
recall, since the target paragraph was better recalled when it had been
presented in the passage version in which it was important. The effect of
importance was strong and significant on an immediate recall test, and a
one week delayed free recall revealed that the target passage suffered
less forgetting when it was important.
Similar results have been found using the story grammar method of
discourse analysis developed by Rumelhart (1975). Story grammars have been
developed to provide a schema-theoretic account of text structure (see
Rumelhart & Ortony, 1977). Rumelhart (1977) analyzed stories into
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hierarchical structures and presented them to subjects who had to recall
or summarize them. Those story elements which were more important in terms
of position in the hierarchy were more likely to be recalled or included
in summaries.
importance and levels of processing. Although little attention has
been paid to the explanation of why important materials are better recalled,
one possibility is that subjects identify the important elements of the
passage and spend more time or effort encoding those elements. The levels
of processing notion of Anderson (1970, 1972) and Craik and Lockhart (1972;
Craik, 1973) can be applied to explain better recall of important elements
in terms of deeper or more meaningful encoding.
Important elements are semantically encoded and elaborated into a
rich and durable memorial representation. Unimportant elements are, in
general, processed only to the depth necessary to determine that they
are relatively unimportant, and are, in any case, not as deeply or elab-
oratively processed as the important elements. The skilled reader,
realizing that he or she hasa limited processing capacity and cannot
deeply encode all the information in the text during reading (Frederiksen,
1972, 1975a, 1975b), identifies an abstract (Gomilicki, 1956) or core of
important material for deep encoding. Since important elements are more
deeply encoded, they are less subject to forgetting, an advantage that
increases with the retention interval (e.g., Newman, 1939; Meyer, 1975).
However, more semantic, eleborative processing of important materials
should lead not only to better memory for the material that was explicitly
stated, but also to increased inferential processing. I have argued
throughout this paper that readers cannot draw all possible inferences,
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just as they cannot deeply encode all the explicit material. Therefore,
the reader will select the important elements for inferential elaboration,
or, put another way, the reader will be more likely to make an inference
if it is important.
Pichert and Anderson (1977) offer a slightly different account
of the effect of importance: they argue that subjects encode text by
using it to instatiate or fill the slots in preexisting knowledge struc-
tures called schemata. Important material is important and better remem-
bered because it fills a slot in the schema that is being instantiated
during reading. By this account, important inferences would be made in
order to fill slots left unspecified in the text.
Importance as an inherent aspect of text: Some snags. A common
feature of discourse structure analyses, including those of Kintsch and
Meyer, as well as others such as Frederiksen (1972, 1975c) and Crothers
(1972) is that they treat text structure as though it were an inherent
attribute of the text. Thus, Kintsch and Meyer derive a measure of the
importance of an element of a text from the position of that element
in the structure of the text. Such an approach can only be psychologically
adequate if the meaning of text is in fact invariant across subjects and
contexts. These researchers almost certainly never meant to imply that
context and subject factors could be ignored in the representation of
text, and the implication is surely false. Bransford and Johnson (1972)
and Schallert (1976) have demonstrated the importance of context. Brans-
ford and Johnson showed that a vague, opaquely written passage which in
isolation seemed nonsense and was very poorly recalled could become per-
fectly sensible and easily recalled when given the proper title or illus-
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tration as context. Schallert showed that the same ambiguous passage
could be given two very different meanings when preceded by different
title contexts.
Anderson, Reynolds, Schallert, and Goetz (in press) used ambiguous
passages similar to those of Schallert (1976) to show the effect of reader
interest and knowledge on the interpretation of text. They found, for
instance, that upon reading a passage that was ambiguous between a de-
scription of a card game and an account of an instrumental quartet prac-
tice, music students were far more likely to construct the latter inter-
pretation than were physical education students. Pichert and Anderson
(1977) have demonstrated the effect of reader perspective on the
rated importance and recall of idea units in text. One of their passages
was a story about two boys who played hooky from school and went to play
at the home of one of the boys. The passage contained some information
which would be of special interest to a prospective home buyer (e.g.,
information about new house siding, a fireplace, and a damp and musty
basement), and other information which would be more likely to interest
a burglar (e.g., information about the existence and location of 10-speed
bicycles and a color television, and the fact that no one was home on
Thursdays). A rating study was conducted in which different groups of
subjects were asked to read the-passage and rate the importance of idea
units from the perspective of a home buyer or from the perspective of a
burglar. A control group was told nothing about perspective. ff impor-
tance were an inherent aspect of text, as implied by existing text anal-
ysis systems, then assigned perspective should have had no effect on rated
importance and the rank order correlation of the rated importance of
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idea units between groups should have approached +1. This prediction was
clearly disconfirmed by low intergroup correlation. In a related study,
subjects who had been assigned to one of the perspective conditions read
the passage and later recalled it. The importance ratings from a given
perspective were the best predictors of the recall of subjects who read the
passage from that perspective.
The Present Study
Two experiments are reported in which the effect of importance was
tested. Although differences between the knowledge and interests or per-
spective of readers were emphasized in the research of Anderson et al.
(in press) and Pichert and Anderson (1977), there is also a large
body of knowledge, opinion, and belief which is shared by most members of
a culture. Importance can be manipulated by tapping these commonalities.
For example, most persons view a fatal plane crash as more important than
a routine weather delay. Therefore,an action or event which prevents
a person from boarding a doomed plane is likely to be viewed as more im-
portant than if the same action or event merely reduced the time spent
waiting for a delayed flight. Importance was manipulated in this manner
in the experiments that are reported in this paper.
In the present studies, important and unimportant passage versions
were constructed so that the plausibility of the inference, which was in-
vestigated by Thorndyke (1976), did not vary. In the story about the
businesswoman, the cause of her tardiness (4) is quite important in the
version shown in Figure 1, since this event saved her life by making her
miss a flight that crashed (5). By contrast, this implication is much less
significant in the unimportant version in which it merely reduced her wait
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for a delayed flight. The fact that the plane crashed in the important
version, however, did nothing to affect the plausibility of the invited
inference, that she was late because she stopped to talk to her son, since
whether a plane crashes or runs behind schedule is not related in any sys-
tematic way to whether a potential passanger is late due to family dis-
cussions, traffic problems, chance reunions with old friends, or any other
possible cause of lateness.
In addition to importance, two other variables were studied. Salience
of the premise was varied by changing the amount of detail or emphasis
given to the material that cued the specific target inference. Explicit-
ness of the target was varied in order to provide a control condition in
which the target had been explicitly stated.
In Experiment I, recognition was tested using a four-alternative
multiple-choice test. After selecting an answer, the subject rated the
closeness of this answer to the original passage. The major prediction
was that importance would increase the probability of an inference being
made. This would be reflected by a greater proportion correct on the
implied target questions for important passage versions than for unimpor-
tant versions. A similar effect of importance was predicted for subjects
who read the stated versions, as this result would replicateMcKoon (1977)
and be in line with the results obtained by Johnson (1970), Meyer and
McConkie (1973), and Kintsch and Keenan (1973). Further, for those in-
ferences correctly recognized, it was predicted that the subject would
be more likely to rate important inferences as having occurred in the pas-
sage, which would be consistent with the interpretation that the effect
of importance was to increase the probability that an inference would be
made at encoding.
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Salience of the premsie should only have an effect when the target
must be inferred, so a significant effect of salience was predicted only
for subjects who read implied versions.
Recognition of premise material and material varied to create the
importance manipulation was also tested, and the conditional probability
of answering the target question correctly given that the premise and/or
importance manipulation question had been answered correctly was computed.
If an effect of importance were found, one possible explanation would be
that importance served to improve the probability that an inference could
be made at test by raising the probability that a subject would retain
at test the information needed to make the inference. If this were true,
recognition of the premise material should be better for important than
unimportant versions, but the probability of correctly answering the target
question, conditional upon a correct answer to the premise question, should
be unaffected by importance. The conditional probabilities were used to
examine this and other hypotheses.
Filler questions which tested memory for material unrelated to the
inference were also included. If the effect of importance was to increase
the interest and memorability of the entire story, these filler questions
would also show the importance effect. No effect was predicted.
Experiment II was a replication of Experiment I using a cued recall
test. All major predictions were the same for Experiment II as for Ex-
periment I.
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CHAPTER II
EXPERIMENT I
Method
Design. A six-way mixed factorial design was used with importance of
the target (important vs. unimportant) as the within-subjects factor, and
salience of the premise (high vs. low) and explicitness of the target
(stated vs. implied) as between-subjects factors. Two subject status vari-
ables were analyzed, grade level (ninth and tenth graders vs. eleventh and
twelfth graders), and verbal ability (low vs. high). Subjects were assigned
to verbal ability conditions independently for the two grade levels. List
(A vs. B) was a between-subjects factor used to counterbalance importance
with passages.
Subjects. The subjects were 184 high school students from a rural
east Central Illinois high school with an approximate enrollment of 220.
They were run in groups of 15 to 30 students.
Materials. Six sets of passages were created such that all passage
versions within a set shared the same target inference. The passages,
ranging from 500 to 520 words in length, were all fictional stories. Each
passage set consisted of eight passage versions, one for each combination
of importance, salience, and explicitness. Passage sets were constructed
so that within a set the target inference was always the same and the various
versions were as similar to each other as possible, given the changes required
by the experimental manipulations. For example, for Passage Set 1, the im-
portant salient stated version of which is shown in Figure 1, the only
difference between stated and implied versions is that the former includes
an explicit statement of the target inference:
She was late because she'd stopped to talk to her son.
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shown at (4) in Figure 1, which does not appear in the implied versions.
The important and unimportant versions differ only in the final para-
graph and only to the extent necessary to vary the importance of the target
inference. In the important version of Passage Set 1, the main character
misses her original flight which, she later discovers, crashes into the
mountains killing all aboard. Instead of this material, which appears at
(5), the unimportant versions state that:
She was told that her flight had been delayed in New York and
would not depart until 3:30 p.m. To kill the time, she stopped
off at the coffee shop for a late lunch and a copy of Business
Week magazine. During the flight she studied some material on a
product introduced only the day before. When she arrived in San
Francisco, a misty rain was sweeping in off the bay.
Thus, in the important versions, the inference that she took time out to
talk to her son is important because this act saved her life. In the un-
important version, the only effect of her talking to her son is a reduction
in the time she spent waiting at the airport. For each passage set, impor-
tant and unimportant versions were matched for the number of words.
Salience of the premises was also manipulated. Thus, at (2) in the
highly salient version of Passage Set 1, the main character remembers that
she had promised to talk to her son. By contrast the less salient versions
state that:
As she finished packing, Joan remembered that her oldest son had
wanted to talk to her before she left town.
Important and unimportant versions of different passage topics were
randomly assigned to lists: the important versions of Passages 1, 2, and 5
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and the unimportant versions of Passages 3, 4, and 6 appeared in List A;
the unimportant versions of Passages 1, 2, and 5 and the important versions
of Passages 3, 4, and 6 appeared in List B. Study booklets containing a
passage from each passage set were constructed from both lists for each of
the four combinations of salience and explicitness. Within the study booklets
passages were ordered using ten random orders selected under the following
constraints: (a) for any order, no more than two important or two unimpor-
tant passage versions occurred consecutively, (b) across all ten orders, each
passage topic appeared in each position at least once and not more than
twice, (c) across all ten orders, important and unimportant versions ap-
peared equally often in every position.
Five four-alternative multiple-choice questions were prepared for each
passage set. The questions for Passage Set 1 are shown in Figure 2. Each
set of questions included one target inference question, one or two premise
questions, a question which covered the information that was included in the
importance manipulation, and as many (one or two) unrelated filler questions
as were needed to bring the total to five. The target questions querried
the inferences which are the focus of the passages. The premise questions
related to the information which pointed toward the target inference, and
the importance manipulation questions covered the part of the story which
was changed in order to manipulate the importance of the target. The
questions appeared one to a page in test booklets in which the questions for
each passage were blocked together. For each subject, the blocks repeated
the order of the passages in the study booklet. Within blocks, the order
of the questions was the same for all subjects, with the target question
always first and the importance manipulation question always last. Each
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Figure 2
Recognition Questions for Passage Set 1,
A Career in Sales
Experiment I
Target Question
1.* Joan was late to the airport because:
a. she got a call from her exhusband.
b. she ran into some old friends.
c. she got caught in traffic.
d. she had to speak with her son.
Premise Questions
4. As Joan finished packing she remembered:
a. That she was expecting a call from her husband.
b. that she and her son were supposed to have a talk.
c. that she had to call the airport to confirm her reservation.
d. that she had to call her friends in San Francisco.
3. When Joan started packing:
a. she barely had enough time to make it to the airport.
b. she had plenty of time to pack before her flight.
c. she knew that she would be late to the airport.
d. she realized that she had already missed her flight.
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Figure 2 (Continued)
Importance Manipulation Question
5. Joan's original 2 o'clock flight to San Francisco:
a. departed late due to a delay in New York.
b. departed late due to fog at O'Hare.
c. crashed into the mountains north of Denver.
d. crashed during takeoff at O'Hare.
Filler Question
2. Joan's career in sales:
a. was moving ahead just as she had planned.
b. was lagging behind her expectations.
c. had progressed much faster than she had expected.
d. had recovered somewhat after a shaky start.
*Numbers indicate the order in which the questions
appeared in the test booklet.
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question was immediately followed by the following 4-point scale on which the
subject was asked to rate how close the answer he or she selected was to the
original story:
1. Exact quote from the story
2. Paraphrase of the story
3. Directly implied by the story
4. Consistent with the story.
This rating was included because the comparison of greatest interest was
between important and unimportant versions for the implied target questions.
Traditional recognition is not ideally suited to this comparison, since it
was developed to test the ability to correctly identify stimuli which have
previously been encountered, and in the present case, the subject had not
seen the target in either condition of the comparison of interest. If sub-
jects make inferences at reading, they should be more likely to think the
inferences were stated in the original passage than if they make the inference
only at the test. The prediction was that the subjects would be more likely
to make inferences during reading if they were important, and that this
effect would be reflected in their ratings.
The Wide Range Vocabulary Test (French, Eckstrom, & Price, 1963) was
used to assess verbal ability.
Procedure. The study instructions directed the subjects to read and thinl
about each story, since they would later be given a test. Following instruc-
tions, subjects were given 33 minutes to read each story. At the conclusion
of the sixth story, the Wide Range Vocabulary Test was administered. Sub-
jects were told that there would be no penalty for guessing, and that they
should not spend too much time on any one item since they probably would not
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have enough time to finish. The subjects were given 4 minutes for the test.
Finally, the subjects were given the recognition test. The subjects were
instructed to select the answer they thought was correct based on the story,
and to choose an answer for every question, even if they had to guess.
They were also asked to rate how close the answer they selected was to the
original story on the rating scale printed beneath each question. Subjects
worked at their own pace, but were enjoined to answer the questions in
order without looking ahead or going back.
Results
Three types of measures were analyzed: (1) proportion correct,
(2) conditional probabilities,and (3) ratings. Unless otherwise stated, all
analyses of variance reported in this section were conducted employihg a
six-way mixed factorial design with subjects as the replication factor,
grade level, verbal ability, list, explicitness, and salience as between-
subjects factors; and importance as a within-subjects factor.
Proportion correct. Proportion correct scores were calculated for each
of the four question types, target, premise, importance manipulation, and
filler. In each case, two scores were calculated for each subject by col-
lapsing across the three important and three unimportant passages. Signifi-
cant effects for all four measures are summarized in Table I. In all of the
analyses, main effects were found for grade level and verbal ability, re-
flecting the fact that subjects from the ninth and tenth grades and those
with low verbal ability scores answered fewer questions correctly.
Target. The focus of the study was to test whether manipulating
the importance of an inference would affect the probability that it would be
made. The proportion of target questions answered correctly provided the
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Table 1
Summary of Significant F-values for the Proportion Correct Measure for
the Four Question Types, Experiment I
Question Type
Effectsa
Target Premise Importance FillerManipulation
Importance of Target (1) 44.7**
Salience of the Premise (S) 5.4*
Explicitness of the Target
(E) 32.7*
Grade (G) 6.2* 12.5** 7-5** 5.3*
Verbal Ability (VA) 5.6* 4.7* 15.0** 4.9*
I x E 4.1*
I x VA 9.4"*
I x List (L) 41.0"* 4.2* 6.8**
S x E 6.4*
I x G x L 6.2*
I x S x VA 4.3"
I x S x L 7.1
I x E x L 8.8*
S x E x VA 5.4* 4.2*
S x E x G x VA 5.7* 12.2* 11.0*
*p < .05
**p < .01
aDegrees of freedom for all F-values were 1,152.
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most direct measure of the hypothesis. Table 2 shows the mean proportion
correct for each importance, salience,and explicitness condition.
The effect of importance (Important = .86, Unimportant = .83) was not
significant overall. However, the major prediction was that importance would
have an effect on the probability that an inference would be made. Since
the target was only an inference for the implied condition, the critical test
of importance applied only to the implied condition. Consistent with this
prediction, a significant Importance X Explicitness interaction was found.
Simple effects analyses of this interaction revealed that the important
passages produced significantly higher scores than the unimportant passages
for the implied condition (Important = .81, Unimportant = .74), F(1,152)=
7.2, p < .01. Thus, the importance of the target inference had a signifi-
cant effect on the probability that the inference would be made. Importance
had no. effect when the target was explicitly stated (Important = .91,
Unimportant = .92), F(1,152) = 0.3, possibly because of a ceiling effect.
As expected, target questions were more often correctly answered when
they had been stated than implied (.92 vs. .78), and when the premise was
highly salient than when the premise was less salient (.88 vs. .82).
Simple main effects tests on the significant Salience X Explicitness inter-
action showed that the effect of salience was highly significant for the
implied condition (Low = .71, High = .84), F(1,152) = 13.6, p < .01, and
totally absent for the stated condition (Low = .92, High = .92), F(1,152) =
.02. The Salience X Explicitness X Verbal Ability interaction reached signif-
icance, apparently because the Salience X Explicitness interaction held only
for low verbal ability students.
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Table 2
Mean Proportion Correct for the
Target Questions, Experiment I
Importance of the target
Explicitness of Salience of
the target the premise Important Unimportant Total
High .90 .93 .92
Stated Low .92 .92 .92
Total .91 .92 .92
High .88 .79 .84
Implied Low .75 .68 .71
Total .81 .74 .78
High .89 .86 .88
Total Low .84 .80 .82
Total .86 .83
47
Two interactions involving list may seem to cloud the issue. The
Importance X List (Table 3A) interaction seems to indicate a reversal in the
importance effect between lists. However, list was merely a counterbalancing
factor, and, for either list, importance was confounded with passages. A
consistent trend for importance was observed when the data were ordered by
passages (Table 3B). The significant Importance X Explicitness X List inter-
action also can be traced to differences among passages, and is of no con-
sequence. One fourth-order interaction reached significance.
Premise. For the analysis of premise questions, neither the im-
portance nor explicitness of the target produced a significant effect.
Surprisingly, salience of the premise had no effect on recognition of the
premise. The only significant second-order interaction was the Importance
X List interaction which resulted from a difference in the difficulty of the
passage groups.
Importance manipulation. This analysis involved questions which
querried the portion of the passage which was changed in order to manipulate
the importance of the target. The proportion of these questions correctly
answered was much higher for the important than for the unimportant con-
dition (.93 vs. .79). The effect of list (A = .83, B = .89) approached
significance (p = .06), while explicitness and salience were not significant.
The significant Importance X Verbal Ability interaction was subjected
to simple main effects analyses which showed that the difference between
high and low verbal ability subjects was not significant for important items,
F(1,152) = 2.2. Differences in verbal ability were highly significant for
unimportant items, F(1,152) = 27.8, p < .01. The significant Importance X
Salience X Verbal ability interaction could be attributed to the markedly
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Table 3A
Cell Means for the Interaction of List and
Importance on the Proportion Correct
for the Target Question, Experiment I
List
A B
Important .92 .80
Unimportant .75 .91
Table 3B
Cell Means for the Interaction of List and
Importance on the Proportion Correct for
the Target Question, Reordered by
Passages, Experiment I*
Passages
1,2,5 3,4,6
Important .92(A) .80(B)
Unimportant .91(B) .75(A)
*List membership shown in parentheses
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depressed scores of low verbal ability people on difficult unimportant para-
graphs.
The Importance X List interaction was significant. Again, this was
due to differences in the difficulty of the passages. The effect of impor-
tance was consistent across the two passage groups.
Filler. None of the main effects of the experimental factors ap-
proached significance, F(1,152) < 1, in all cases.
Conditional probabilities. In each passage set, the premise contained
information which was needed to make the target inference, and the importance
manipulation served to establish the importance of the inference. It was
therefore decided to examine the probability of correctly answering the tar-
get items conditional upon a correct answer of (1) the premise question,
(2) the importance manipulation question, and (3) both the premise and the
importance manipulation questions. Analyses of variance were conducted on
the conditional probabilities. A summary of all significant effects for
the three measures is shown in Table 4.
Passages 1 and 2 had two premise questions. For these passages, the
premise was counted correct only if both questions were correctly answered.
For the probability of correctly answering a target question, given that the
premise question was correctly answered, the main effect of importance
(Important = .87, Unimportant = .84) did not reach significance. However,
further analyses of the significant importance X Explicitness interaction
revealed that manipulating importance made a significant difference for
implied versions (Important = .84, Unimportant = .75), F(1,149) = 9.9,
p < .01, but not for stated versions (Important = .91, Unimportant = .94),
F(1,149) < 1. Similarly, the Salience X Explicitness interaction resulted
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Table 4
Summary of Significant F-values
for Three Conditional Probabilities, Experiment I
Conditional Probabilities
Effects P(Target P(Target Premise
P(Targetl importance and Importance
Premise) Manipulation) Manipulation)c
Explicitness of the
Target (E) 25. 9* 33.4** 21.2*
Grade (G) 4.4*
Verbal Ability (VA) 4.5* 5.6*
Importance of the
Target (I) x E 6.8** 5.7
I x List (L) 88.3** 39.4** 75.5*
Salience of the
Premise (S) x E 5.4" 11.2** 5.8*
G x VA 6,2* 6.3**
I x E x L 29.1** 7.5** 17.8**
S x E x VA 5.0*
S x G x L 3.8* 4.1*
E x G x L 4.9* 3.8*
I x E x G x L 8.0*
S x E x G x VA 7.6** 5,1*
* < .05
* < .01
a
Probability of answering the target question correctly given
that the premise question was answered correctly. Degrees of freedom
for these F-values were 1,149.
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Table 4 (Continued)
bProbability of answering the target question correctly given
that the importance manipulation question was answered correctly.
Degrees of freedom for these F-values were 1,144.
c
Probability of answering the target question correctly given
that the premise and importance manipulation questions were answered
correctly. Degrees of freedom for these F-values were 1,131.
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from the significant simple main effect of salience for the implied versions
(Low = .74, High = .84), F(1,149) = 8.3, p < .01, and the absence of a sali-
ence effect for stated versions (Low = .94, High = .91), F(1,149) < 1.
Overall, the main effect of salience failed significance. The conditional
probability was much higher for stated than implied targets (.93 vs. .79).
The Importance X List and Importance X Explicitness X List interactions were
caused by a difference in the difficulty of the passages. The main effects
of verbal ability and grade level, as well as their significant second-
order interaction were caused by the poor performance of the ninth and tenth
graders with low verbal ability scores.
In the analysis of the probability of correctly answering the target
question given that the importance manipulation was correctly answered, the
only experimental variable which produced a main effect was explicitness,
as explicit versions resulted in higher conditional probabilities (.93
vs. .77). The Importance X Explicitness interaction only approached sig-
nigicance, F(1,144) = 3.2, p = .08; however, the simple main effect of
importance was again significant for passages in which the target was
implied (Important = .81, Unimportant = .74), F(1,144) = 4.4, p < .05.
Differences in the difficulty of the passages produced significant Im-
portance X List and Importance X Explicitness X List interactions. The
Salience X Explicitness interaction was significant and the salience main
effect approached significance, F(1,144) = 3.0, p = .09, as highly salient
premises produced higher conditional probabilities in the implied condi-
tion (High = .84, Low = .70).
For the analysis of the probability that the target question was
correctly answered, given that both the premise and importance manipula-
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tion questions were correctly answered, the critical Importance X Explicit-
ness interaction again reached significance, as the important passage ver-
sions produced higher conditional probabilities than did the unimportant
versions for the implied condition (.84 vs. .77), but importance produced no
effect when the target was stated. The Salience X Explicitness interaction
reached significance as highly salient premises increased the conditional
probability for implied targets (.85 vs. .76), but not for stated targets.
Passages in which the target was stated produced much higher scores than im-
plied passages (.93 vs..80) while the main effects of both importance and
salience failed significance. Once again differences in the difficulty of
the passages were reflected in significant Importance X List and Importance
X Explicitness X List interactions. The main effects of grade level and ver-
bal ability failed significance, but their second-order interaction was sig-
nificant, due to the poor performance of low verbal ability ninth and tenth
grade students.
Ratings. The subjects' ratings were subjected to analyses of variance.
These ratings indicated the perceived closeness of the selected alternative
to the passage on the following scale:
I = Exact quote from the story
2 = Paraphrase of the story
3 = Directly implied by the story
4 = Consistent with the story.
It should be noted that lower ratings indicate greater perceived closeness.
Only the ratings of correctly answered items were entered in the analyses.
In order to be included in an analysis, a subject was required to have at
least one correct response for each importance condition. Significant
effects from analyses of variance on ratings of the target, premise, and
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importance manipulation questions are summarized in Table 5.
Target. Table 6 shows the mean rating for each combination
of importance, salience, and explicitness. When the target had been stated,
it was rated as much closer to the presented text than when it had been
implied (1.90 vs. 2.56), F(1,145) = 50.6, p < .01. The fact that the
ratings were sensitive to this manipulation provides evidence for the
validity of this measure.
The most interesting comparison produced a significant result: the
targets from important versions were rated as closer to the passage than
those from unimportant versions (2.16 vs. 2.30). The Importance X Explicit-
ness interaction approached significance, F(1,145) = 3.0, p = .09. The
difference between important and unimportant targets was greater for the
implied (Important = 2.44, Unimportant= 2.69) than stated condition (Im-
portant = 1.88, Unimportant = 1.92). Simple main effects tests confirmed
that the importance effect was significant only for the implied condition,
F(1,145) = 10.4, p < .01.
Ninth and tenth graders tended to use lower ratings than did eleventh
and twelfth graders (2.09 vs. 2.37). The Explicitness X Grade Level inter-
action was tested for simple main effects. The simple effect of grade
level was significant in the implied condition (Low = 2.30, High = 2.82),
F(1,145) = 17.1, p < .01, but not in the stated condition (Low = 1.87,
High = 1.92), F(1,145) < '.
In order to permit a direct test of the prediction that important
targets would more often be rated as having been stated in the passage than
unimportant targets, the rating data were collapsed in order to compute
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Table 5
Summary of Significant F-values for the Rated Closeness to the
Original Passage for Three Question Types, Experiment I
Question Type
EffectsEffects a b ImportanceTarget Premise . cManipulation
Importance of the Target (1) 5.9* 21.2"*
Explicitness of the Target (E) 50.6** 5.9*
Grade (G) 9.2* 4.0*
List (L) 4.1*
I x L 6.5*
E x G 6.3*
G x L 5.0*
I x Salience of the Premise (S)
x E x Verbal Ability (VA) 4.8*
S x E x G x VA 5.4*
S x E x VA x L 6.8*
I x S x E x G x VA x L 4.0*
* < .05
** < .01
aDegrees of freedom for these F-values were 1,145.
bDegrees of freedom for these F-values were 1,149.
c Degrees of freedom for these F-values were 1,144.
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Table 6
Mean Rated Closeness to the Passage* for
Correctly Answered Target Questions, Experiment I
Importance of the target
Explicitness of Salience of
the target the premise Important Unimportant Total
High 1.92 2.02 1.97
Stated Low 1.83 1.82 1.83
Total 1.88 1.92 1.90
High 2.46 2.61 2.54
Implied Low 2.42 2.76 2.59
Total 2.44 2.69 2.56
High 2.19 2.32 2.25
Total Low 2.13 2.28 2.21
Total 2.16 2.30
*Rating scale used was as follows:
1 = Exact quote of the story
2 = Paraphrase of the story
3 = Directly implied by the story
4 = Consistent with the story
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the proportion of items which were judged to have been stated in the
passage, that is, the number of correctly answered target questions which
received a rating of lor 2. The means organized by the three experimental
variables are shown in Table 7. Important targets were indeed more often
rated as having been stated in the passage than unimportant targets (.66
vs. .58), F(1,145) = 6.7, p < .05. This effect was especially pronounced
for implied targets (Important = .50, Unimportant = .39). This analysis
further emphasized the subjects' ability to distinguish between stated (.79)
and implied (.45) versions, F(1,145) = 63.3, p < .01. None of the inter-
actions involving importance approached significance.
Premise. Neither the salience of the premise nor the importance
of the inference affected premise ratings. The premise was rated as closer
to the original passage for implied than for stated versions (1.73 vs.
1.91). Eleventh and twelfth graders rated the premise as closer to the
original than did ninth and tenth graders (1.75 vs. 1.90).
Importance manipulation. The analysis of variance on ratings of
importance manipulation questions yielded three significant effects. The
important versions were rated much closer than were unimportant versions
(1.77 vs. 2.02). This difference was far more pronounced for the group
of Passages 3, 4, and 6 (Important = 1.75, Unimportant = 2.17) than for
Passages 1, 2, and 5 (Important = 1.79, Unimportant = 1.86) as shown by the
significant Importance X List interaction reordered by passages. Finally,
the main effect of list was significant (A = 1.98, B = 1.80).
Summary of the results: Experiment I. When people read text, they are
more likely to make an inference based on that text if the inference is
important to the story they are reading. This is evidenced by the fact
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Table 7
Proportion of Correctly Answered Target Questions
Rated as Having been Stated in the Text, Experiment I
Importance of the target
Explicitness of Salience of
the target the premise Important Unimportant Total
High .78 .71 .74
Stated Low .84 .83 .83
Total .81 .77 .78
High .48 .43 .45
Implied Low .53 .36 .44
Total .50 .39 .45
High .63 .57 .60
Total Low .68 .59 .64
Total .66 .58
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that for implied passage versions, in which the answer to the target ques-
tion had to be inferred, correct recognition of the target was greater after
reading important passage versions than after unimportant versions. No
effect of importance was found for targets which had been stated. Salience
of the premise also had an effect on the probability of correctly inferring
an implied target. For passages in which the target had been stated,
salience had no effect. Not surprisingly, subjects in the stated condition,
who read passages which contained statements of the target, did far better
than subjects in the implied condition.
Premises contained information which invited the target inference.
No effect of the explicitness or importance of the target on the recog-
nition of premise information was found. When performance on the target was
conditionalized on correct recognition of premise information, important
inferences were still more likely to be correctly recognized.
The importance manipulation questions tested the information which
extablished the importance of the target inference in the passage. The pro-
portion of importance manipulation questions correctly answered was much
higher for important passage versions than for unimportant versions. The
form and meaning of the importance manipulation material was confounded
with importance value, however, so the interpretation of this finding is
unclear. The probability of the target being correct, given that the
importance manipulation question was correctly answered, was greater for
important implied passages than for unimportant implied passages.
When target question performance was conditionalized on correct
answers to both premise and importance manipulation questions, the simple
main effect of importance for the implied condition again confirmed the
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advantage of important inferences. In this analysis the main effects of grade
level and verbal ability, which were highly significant for the simple pro-
portion correct of target items (and the proportion correct of all other
question types as well), failed significance. Thus, once scores for pas-
sages on which the subject failed to encode and retain the information
related to the target had been discounted, no effect of grade level or
verbal ability remained.
Unrelated or filler questions were also included and analyzed. The
possibility of the importance effect being due to some sort of diffuse,
nonspecific facilitation was disconfirmed by the absence of any effect of
importance on these filler items.
The present study also involved a rating of how close an answer was
to the original passage. As predicted, important inferences were rated as
closer to the original passage than unimportant inferences. An additional
analysis revealed that importance increased the proportion of inferred
targets rated as having been explicitly stated in the passage. The ratings
of target questions proved highly sensitive to the explicitness of the
target: subjects who read passages in which the target was stated were far
more likely to rate it as explicitly stated than were subjects who read
passages in which the target was implied.
Premise questions were rated as closer to the original passage for
implied than for stated passages. This suggests that subjects processed
premises more deeply or extensively when they were needed to derive an
inference. These ratings might be seen as a more sensitive measure of
comprehension and memory, since no effect of the explicitness of the
target was found for the proportion of premise questions correctly answered.
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However, premises in passages in which the target was important were not
rated as closer to the passage, although deeper processing of the premise
was predicted for this condition.
The importance manipulation questions were rated as closer to the
original important passages than to the unimportant passages, but since
the form and content of this material was confounded with importance value,
this result is ambiguous.
The major predictions of the study were thus confirmed: important
inferences were more often correctly recognized and also were more likely
to be rated as having been explicitly stated in the passage than were
unimportant inferences. Highly explicit premises also increased the like-
lihood that implied targets would be correctly recognized.
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CHAPTER III
EXPERIMENT II
Method
Design. The design was the same as that for Experiment I.
Subjects. The subjects were 198 students from a high school in east
central Illinois and a high school in Northwestern Ohio. They were run in
groups of 15 to 30 students.
Materials. The passages were the same as those used in Experiment I.
Four completion questions were prepared for each passage. The questions for
Passage 1 are shown in Figure 3. Each question set contained a target
question, an importance manipulation question, and one or two premise
questions. A filler question was included for those question sets with one
premise question in order to equate the number of questions per passage.
Questions were presented in booklets as in Experiment I.
Procedure. Instructions and procedures for the study phase and vocab-
ulary test were the same as for Experiment I. Test instructions stressed
that the subjects should work through the booklet in order and that they
should answer as many questions as possible. They were told to answer the
questions according to the story, with answers that might be just a few words
and should never be "longer than a sentence or two." Subjects were told
to work at their own pace.
Results
Answers were scored for gist. If an answer was essentially a para-
phrase of the story element, or a verbatim representation, it was scored as
correct. If some material was added to, deleted from, or distorted in the
answer, so as to change its meaning, but the answer was still identifiable
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Figure 3
Cued Recall Questions for Passage Set 1,
A Career in Sales
Experiment II
Target Question
1.* Why was Joan late getting to the airport?
Premise Questions
2. What did Joan remember as she was finishing packing for her trip?
3. At the beginning of the story, how much time did Joan have to
finish and to get to the airport?
Importance Manipulation Question
4. What happened to Joan's original two o'clock flight to San
Francisco?
*Numbers indicate the order in which the questions appeared
in the test booklet.
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as related to the story element, it was scored as partially correct. The
scoring was done by a highly skilled assistant who was not aware of the na-
ture of the experiment. The experimenter independently scored twenty
protocols. The interrater reliability was .90.
Proportion correct and partially correct. Analyses were conducted
on the proportion correct, and proportion correct or partially correct for
target, premise, and importance manipulation questions. Filler questions
were not analyzed because not all passages had filler questions. Except
where noted, all analyses of variance reported below were six-way mixed
analyses with importance as the within-subjects factor and salience, explicit-
ness, list, grade level, and verbal ability as between-subjects factors.
Significant effects for the analyses of proportion correct and partially
correct for the target, premise, and importance manipulation questions are
shown in Table 8. In each analysis, subjects with high verbal ability and
students in the higher grade level performed better, as evidenced by sig-
nificant verbal ability and grade level effects.
Target. The mean proportion correct and partially correct for
the target questions is reported by importance, salience, and explicitness
in Table 9. For the proportion correct, important versions produced higher
scores than unimportant versions (.70 vs. .63). Simple main effects tests
on the significant Importance X Explicitness interaction revealed that im-
portant passages exceeded unimportant passages in the implied condition
(.60 vs. .47), F(1,166) = 14.2, p < .01. Thus, the effect of importance on
the probability of an inference was replicated with cued recall. The effect
of importance (Important = .79, Unimportant = .78) failed significance for
the stated versions, F(1,166) < 1. When the salience of the premise was
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Table 9
Mean Proportion Correct and Partially Correct for the
Target Question, Experiment II*
Importance of the target
Explicitness of Salience of
the target the premise Important Unimportant Total
High .79 (.86) .78 (.87) .79 (.87)
Stated Low .80 (.88) .78 (.83) .79 (.86)
Total .79 (.87) .78 (.85) .79 (.86)
High .72 (.79) .47 (.58) .60 (.68)
Implied Low .48 (.55) .47 (.52) .47 (.54)
Total .60 (.67) .47 (.55) .54 (.61)
High .76 (.82) .63 (.73) .69 (.77)
Total Low .64 (.72) .63 (.68) .63 (.70)
Total .70 (.77) .63 (.70)
*Proportions for the partially correct measure shown in parentheses.
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low, performance on the target question was lower than when the premise
was highly salient (.63 vs. .69), though the effect was only marginally
significant, F(1,166) = 3.6, p = .06. As revealed by the Salience X Ex-
plicitness interaction, the effect of salience obtained only in the implied
condition (Low = .54, High = .68); the two levels of salience produced al-
most identical scores in the stated condition (Low = High = .86). The
subjects who read passages in which the target was stated did much better
than those for whom the target was implied (.79 vs. .54).
The Importance X List interaction, when reordered by passage set,
revealed that the effect of importance was much more pronounced for the
group of Passages 1, 2, and 5 (Important = .76, Unimportant = .65), than
for Passages 3, 4, and 6 (Important = .63, Unimportant = .61). For pas-
sages in which the target was implied, the superiority of the important
high salience passages over other passage versions produced a significant
Importance X Salience X Explicitness interaction. None of the interactions
involving the subject status variables reached significance.
The analysis that included partially correct answers to target questions
was similar to the above analysis in all important respects. The effect
of importance was again highly significant, and much more pronounced for the
implied versions (Important = .68, Unimportant = .55), where the target
had to be inferred, than for the passages in which the target had been stated
(Important = .87, Unimportant = .85), producing a significant Importance X
Explicitness interaction. Examination of the Salience X Explicitness in-
teraction revealed that the main effect of explicitness was completely
accounted for in the implied condition. A significant Importance X Salience
X Explicitness interaction resulted from the high scores obtained by sub-
jects for important highly salient versions of the implied passages rela-
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tive to the other implied versions. Inspection of the Importance X List
interaction showed that the advantage of important versions was most marked
for the set of Passages 1, 2, and 5.
For about 6% of the question sets, a subject produced an answer which
constituted a correct response to the target question when answering a
premise-or importance manipulation question. An additional analysis was
conducted in which the target was counted correct if the answer to the
target question itself was correct or partially correct, or if an acceptable
answer to the target question appeared as the answer to one of the other
questions. The results of this analysis were essentially identical to the
analysis of the partially correct measure.
Premise. Highly salient premises were better recalled than less
salient premises for both the correct (.56 vs. .50) and partially correct
(.57 vs. .50) measures. The importance and the explicitness of the target
both failed to affect recall of the premise. The highly significant Im-
portance X List interaction resulted from differences in difficulty between
the passage sets (for example, for the proportion correct, Passages 1, 2,
5 = .60, Passages 3, 4, 6 = .46).
Importance manipulation. In the analyses of the questions which
tested the material embodying the importance manipulation, performance on
the important versions exceeded the unimportant versions (.75 vs. .66 for
correct, .89 vs. .72 for partially correct). The Importance X List interac-
tion, when reorganized by passages, revealed that the advantage of important
passages held only for the group of Passages 3, 4, and 6 (.79 vs. .56 for
correct, .90 vs. .61 for partially correct). For Passages 1, 2, and 5,
the effect of importance was inconsistent across the two performance measures
70
(.70 vs. .76 for correct, .87 vs. .84 for partially correct). List B was
much better recalled than List A. Although several other effects reached
significance, only one fourth-order interaction obtained for both dependent
measures.
Conditional probabi ities. The probability of correctly answering the
target question given that the premise, the importance manipulation, or both
had been correctly answered using both strict and lenient scoring criteria,
was subjected to the six-way analysis of variance. However, the number of
cases meeting the conditions was very low in some analyses. Since neither
grade nor ability had effects, these variables were dropped and the data
were reanalyzed in four-way mixed analyses with salience, explicitness, and
list as between-subjects factors and importance as the within-subject factor.
Significant effects from all three analyses are summarized in Table 10.
For Passages 1, 2, and 4, which each had two premise questions, the
premise was counted correct only if both questions were correct. When the
probability of correctly answering the target given that the premise ques-
tion was correctly answered was analyzed, important passage versions pro-
duced higher conditional probabilities than the unimportant versions (.84
vs. .74 for correct, .87 vs. .78 for partially correct). Conditional
probabilities were much higher for subjects who read passages in which the
target was stated than for those who read the implied versions (.88 vs.
.70 for correct, .89 vs. .76 for partially correct). In this analysis,
which was conditional upon a correct answer to the premise question, sali-
ence of the premise had no effect. The Importance X Explicitness and Im-
portance X Salience X Explicitness interactions, which were significant in
the analyses of the simple proportion of target questions correctly answered,
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here failed to approach significance. No other effects approached sig-
n ificance,
As Table 10 shows, the analyses of the probability of correctly answer-
ing the target question given that the importance manipulation question was
answered correctly produced a number of effects which attained significance
for only one of the two analyses. Only those effects which were signif-
icant across both correct and partially correct measures will be discussed
here. The conditional probabilities were higher for important than for
unimportant passages (.74 vs. .63 for correct, .82 vs. .70 for partially
correct). Stated passages produced much higher conditional probabilities
than did implied passages (.81 vs. .56 for correct, .90 vs. .62 for par-
tially correct). The importance X Explicitness interaction reached sig-
nificance because the effect of importance was much greater when the target
had to be inferred (e.g., for correct, Important = .66, Unimportant = .47
for implied passages, Important = .83, Unimportant = .79 for stated passages).
Table 11 shows the mean probability of correctly answering the target
question, given that both premise and importance manipulation questions
were correctly answered. The important versions produced higher conditional
probabilities than the unimportant versions for both the correct and par-
tially correct measures (.84 vs. .69 and .88 vs. .74, respectively).
Stated targets were better than implied targets (.84 vs. .67 for correct,
.88 vs. .74 for partially correct). As was found in the analysis which
conditionalized on correct responses to the premise questions only, salience
of the premise had no effect and the importance X Explicitness and Impor-
tance X Salience X Explicitness interactions did not approach significance.
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Table 11
Probability of Answering the Target Question
Correctly Given that the Premise and Importance
Manipulation Questions were Answered Correctly, Experiment II*
Importance of the target
Explicitness of Salience of
the target the premise Important Unimportant Total
High .92 (.94) .80 (.86) .86 (.90)
Stated Low .91 (.94) .83 (.85) .87 (.90)
Total .91 (.94) .81 (.86) .86 (.90)
High .84 (.85) .54 (.56) .69 (.71)
Implied Low .69 (.78) .59 (.69) .64 (.73)
Total .77 (.81) .57 (.63) .67 (.72)
High .88 (.89) .67 (.71) .77 (.80)
Total Low .80 (.86) .71 (.77) .76 (.81)
Total .84 (.88) .69 (.74)
*Conditional probabilities
in parentheses.
for the partially correct measure shown
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Summary of the results: Experiment II. When cued recall was employed
as a test of inference, the probability that an inference would occur was
again found to be greater for important than for unimportant inferences.
The significant main effect of importance in the study derived solely
from the passage versions where the target was implied, and primarily from
the highly salient implied versions. Similarly, salience of the premise
affected the likelihood that the target inference would be drawn but had
no effect when the target had been stated in the passage.
The accuracy of cued recall for premises was influenced by neither the
importance nor the explicitness of the target. Highly salient premises
were better recalled than less salient premises. The probability of cor-
rectly supplying the target, conditional upon correctly supplying the prem-
ise, again favored important targets. Salience of the premise had no
effect on the recall of the target in this conditional analysis.
The information which was changed in order to manipulate importance
proved to be much easier to recall for the important versions than for the
unimportant versions. The effect of importance on the target questions
was highly significant when conditionalized upon a correct response to the
importance manipulation question. In other words, subjects were particu-
larly likely to produce an important inference if they realized its impor-
tance, as evidenced by the ability to recall the information that estab-
lished its importance.
For the probability of correctly answering the target given that the
premise question, or the premise and importance manipulation questions, had
been correctly answered, the effect of importance was consistent across
stated and implied versions.
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CHAPTER IV
GENERAL DISCUSSION
People are more likely to make an inference if it is important than
if it is unimportant. That this is so has been documented in two experi-
ments, and has been found using both multiple-choice recognition and cued re-
call measures. While the significance of the effect did not generalize a-
cross all materials, in each experiment the trend that important inferences
were made more often than unimportant inferences was observed for four of
the six passage sets. Given the intuitive nature of the importance manip-
ulation in these studies, the effect has shown reasonable generality. If
importance were more rigorously defined, or if extensive piloting were /
employed to insure that the intuitions of the target population agreed with
those of the experimenter, no doubt the success rate of .67 could be im-
proved upon. For the recognition test, the effect of importance was con-
sistent across two levels of the salience of premise information. For
the cued recall test, important inferences exceeded unimportant inferences
only when the premises were highly salient. Probably when the premises
were less salient there were not sufficient cues to insure that importance
would increase the probability of the target inference being made; instead
importance only increased the probability that some inference would be
made. When subjects correctly recalled the premise and importance manip-
ulation, the effect of importance was consistent across highly salient and
less salient passage versions.
The studies reported here are among the first to explore the effect
Of text content and structure on inference. Nearly all of the previous
research has been designed to (a) demonstrate that inference is an important
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and pervasive process, (b) establish whether the temporal locus of inference
is at comprehension or at test, or (c) explore the effect of instructions and
tasks on inference.
The present research may be viewed as an extension of the literature on
the effect of importance on memory for text. Johnson (1970), Meyer (1975),
Meyer and McConkie (1973), Kintsch and Keenan (1973), and others have shown
that importance improves memory for explicitly stated material. The current
research establishes that impogrtLane also increases the probability that an
inference will be made. In these studies, the effect of importance did not
reach significance for targets which had been stated. However, in the rec-
ognition test of Experiment I, this may have been due to a ceiling effect.
In Experiment II, when consideration was restricted to those passages for
which a subject encoded and retained enough of the material related to the
inference to permit him or her to correctly recall the premise and importance
manipulation items, the effect of importance was consistant across stated and
implied versions.
While the studies were not designed to test whether the temporal locus
of the importance effect was at comprehension or at test, some evidence re-
lated to this issue was obtained. In Experiment I, subjects were more like-
ly to rate an inference as having been stated in the passage if the inference
was important than if it was unimportant. This result is exactly what would
be expected if importance served to increase the probability that an infer-
ence would be made during comprehension, and if subjects were sometimes un-
able to distinguish between inferences made during reading and statements
which had actually been read. However, this could also result from a higher
proportion of lucky hits for unimportant inferences. Unimportant inferences
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were less often correctly recognized, and it is therefore reasonable to as-
sume that a higher percentage of the correct responses were lucky guesses.
If subjects had simply guessed at the answer to the inference question, they
would presumably be aware of that fact and might therefore be less likely to
rate the answer as having been stated in the passage. Thus, the ratings do
not unequivocally support the hypothesis that the locus of the importance ef-
fect was at comprehension.
Perhaps more convincing evidence that many inferences, and therefore
much of the effect of importance on inference, occurred at comprehension is
that the probability of correctly answering the inference question, given
that the premise question had been incorrectly answered, was well above
chance in both studies (.67 for Experiment I, .43 and .52 for correct and
partially correct measures, respectively, in Experiment II). To the extent
that the premise questions querried information which was required in order
to make an inference, subjects who missed the premise question could only
answer the inference question correctly if they had made the inference
during reading or if they guessed. However, as I argued in the portion of
the introduction which dealt with the temporal locus of inference, it is
unlikely that inferences are made only at comprehension or at test, and the
evidence here does not conclusively disconfirm the possibi-lity that impor-
tance might also affect the probability of inference at test.
One explanation of the importance effect which has some a priori
appeal is clearly disconfirmed by the data. Importance might serve to
increase the probability or quality of encoding the information needed to
make the inference. If this occurred, the probability of being able to
make at test an inference which had not been made at encoding would be
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greater for important than unimportant inferences, since the probability
of retaining at test the information necessary to make the inference would
be greater for important inferences. The essential prediction of this
hypothesis to the present studies is better performance on premise questions
for important passage versions. Neither the recognition nor cued recall of
premises showed any hint of an effect for importance. In the passages used
in these studies, the information which established the importance of an
inference came at the end of the passage, after all of the other material
related to the inference. The passages are similar in this respect to those
of Thorndyke (1976), and to a lesser extent to the materials employed by
Spiro (1975). If the importance manipulation had appeared at the beginning
of the passage, it would presumably affect the initial encoding of related
information and lead to better memory for the premises of important in-
formation.
If the effect of importance had occurred at comprehension in the present
studies, it must have been a backward effect. One possible scenario would
be that when a subject discovered that an event, like being late to the
airport, was important in the story, the subject would check his or her
memory for the event to see if it was a fully elaborated, coherent account.
If the memorial representation of the event was not coherent, as would be
the case if the subject had not inferred the cause of lateness, the subject
would look back through the passage in order to find information whtch would
permit the event to be elaborated so as to make it coherent. This scenario
is a special case of the hypothesis discussed above that importance would
serve to increase the probability of encoding the premise information. That
this did not often occur is evidenced by the lack of an importance effect
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on the premise questions. The reason that it did not occur may have been
that fitting an experiment in which students read and were tested on six
passages into a 40-minute school period dictated that reading times be
kept to a minimum. Observation of the subjects during the experiments
suggested that many had barely enough time to read the passages completely,
and that many others seemed to adopt the strategy of reading straight through
the passage once at a rapid rate, and then waiting for the signal to go on.
If subjects had insufficient time to finish some of the passages, the ef-
fect of importance would be attenuated since the importance manipulation
came at the end of the passage. If subjects had just enough time to finish
the passage or if they adopted a "don't look back" reading strategy, then
this could account for the lack of an importance effect on premise questions.
One variation on the above scenario is that when a coherence check
for an important event fails, the subject would initiate a search of memory
for the passage in order to see if any information related to the event
could be retrieved to permit the inferential elaboration of a coherent ac-
count. If the information is found, the invited inference would be made.
If the information is not found, an inference would be constructed on the
basis of prior knowledge, sometimes producing an "incorrect" inference.
This account is consistent with the finding in Experiment II that important
inferences were more likely to be recalled for passages with salient and
therefore memorable premises, but not for passages with low salience For
those passages for which a subject remembered the premise, the probability
of recalling the target inference was higher in the important condition.
This explanation, however, also would seem to predict better recall for
premises in important passage versions.
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A final possibility that deserves consideration is that the importance
may simply motivate subjects to try harder to answer questions correctly.
By this motivational explanation, it is not essential that importance dif-
ferentially affect either the probability of the inference at comprehension
or the encoding of the premise. A motivational explanation explains better
retrieval of inferences made at comprehension and higher probability of
correctly making the inference at test, given that the premise information
is available. In fact, the motivation hypothesis also explains better
memory for explicitly stated material, which is typical of important infor-
mation, as shown by Johnson (1970), Meyer (1975), and others. Studies in
which incentives for remembering information would be manipulated could be
used to test this hypothesis.
In conclusion, this research has demonstrated rather convincingly that
people are more likely to make an inference in text if it is important.
While the studies provide some evidence against several explanations of the
effect, much remains to be resolved before our understanding of the effect
of importance on inference is complete.
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